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ABSTRACT
Effectively spotting anomalies in network or application operations can be
challenging in very large, complex networks, making it difficult to be alerted to their
presence in order to take action to remediate such anomalies. Proper anomaly detection is
impeded by too much data from too many disparate sources, which may manifest in too
many different ways on various network devices ("the curse of dimensionality" familiar to
many machine learning (ML) practitioners).
Proposed herein is a novel implementation of a Long Short-Term Memory based
Variational Autoencoder (LSTM-VAE) to detect such anomalies, and an associated
visualization technique to display them to the network manager for subsequent remediation.
By so doing, the described technique provide a novel method of anomaly detection in large,
complex networks in a way not otherwise possible.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
A typical modern network can have more than 30,000 devices. For some larger
scale networks, there can be more than 100,000 devices. The anomalies in a network can
lead to disruptive effects in network environments. Further, the number of non-impacting,
false positive anomalies can mask disruptive anomalies in the noise. To monitor a network,
the existing anomaly detection (AD) approach requires monitoring activities for each
device and each telemetry in real time. Previously, this kind of monitoring was performed
with human involvement, e.g., looking into dashboards and interacting with users. This
type of monitoring suffers from low efficiency and high cost. With powerful artificial
intelligence (AI) and machine learning, monitoring without human involvement is now
possible. Systems often will deploy separate machine learning engines for different
devices and different variables (e.g., CPU, memory, interfaces, etc.). This approach is not
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feasible for large-scale networks: there can be ~10,000 variables (CPU, memory, interfaces,
etc.) for each device. In this case, 30,000*10,000 different ML solutions could potentially
exist. This number of solutions is infeasible for deployment and operation/execution. An
efficient system that is lean, easy to monitor, track, and operate is needed. The system
needs to be able to identify both new and known (based on prior learning of this same
system) anomalies while reducing false alarms introduced by device status changes such
as software updates, system reboots, and dynamic network environment changes.
Moreover, no ML solutions are known that address the correlation of multiple
anomalies at the device level using telemetry time series data. Consider as an example the
malicious Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks. The network element being
targeted is attacked using many machines that send similar IP packets with strong time
synchronicity to drain resources at the victim end-point. In this case, investigating one
device and one telemetry will not raise an alert.
In another example, a common network loop condition will cause anomalous
counters across many variables per device throughout the loop domain. Each device will
show anomalies, and the anomalies will show in variables from the data path of the loop
as well as the resource variables of individual devices.
While these are known conditions, the problem is further exacerbated because
different device types react differently to the same condition. In the cases of DDoS or loop,
some devices have CPU or control plane protection, while others do not. Some devices
will display high resource utilization for CPU or bandwidth, while others will display
anomalous counters for CPU or bandwidth protection mechanisms. Learning how a device
manifests anomalies to adverse conditions is necessary to identify which type of behavior
group the device falls into.
When displaying time series telemetry anomalies for human consumption, one can
observe anomalies on multiple telemetry streams or multiple devices happened at the same
time or in series. In order to do this, humans must be given the right set of anomalous
streams displayed in the right sequence on a common timeline (assuming the behavior
group is known). Only then can a human observer identify a root cause. But humans are
not able to build and view all possible combinations, permutations, and behavior groups of
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thousands of potential telemetry data streams across hundreds of devices in the network
coverage domain.
The proposed novel anomaly detection system includes the following innovations:
1. a proposed machine learning model architecture for clustering network devices
into behavior groups; and
2. a novel, unsupervised deep learning algorithm structure for multivariate
anomaly detection, the output of which will provide the following:


one ML model for each device or multiple devices;



one anomaly score for each device;



one anomaly score for the entire network; and



a normality band of each telemetry of interest for each time t.

This approach is easy for dashboarding and visualization and does not require any
labeled data given the fact that data labeling can be extremely expensive. Combining
features 1 and 2 above, the complexity of the AD solution can be substantially reduced,
with the following results:
1. reduction of time for training and inference;
2. reduction of cost for system deployment; easy system monitoring and
maintenance;
3. explainable key performance indicators (KPI) on the device level and network
level; and
4. reduction in false alarms.
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the anomaly detection system:

Fig. 1 - Anomaly detection system overview
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The proposed system overcomes the problem of dimensionality by grouping the
devices based on their similarity, as shown in the diagram of Fig. 2. During times when
changes/updates happen to a device, the system will re-evaluate which cluster the device
belongs to. The grouping action provides the benefits of a lean solution space and a
frictionless user experience.

Fig. 2 - Device grouping based on similarity
The proposal system has the following benefits:
1. Lean solution space: the devices are grouped according to similarity. This
excludes any redundancy of the system. For devices that are similar, one
solution is designed and deployed without introducing additional solutions.
The solution space is kept lean and efficient.
2. Frictionless experience: given when device conditions change, the system does
not need to rebuild solutions for the updated device.
The details of grouping devices are given below. The process starts by identifying
the devices of interest. Then, device information is collected including: product family,
SW versions, image names, patches, all hardware PIDS, and FIS modeled features. At a
high level, a first data transformation (text to digit) is performed, then dimensionality
reduction, and then clustering is applied. Devices with similar profiles can be clustered for
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this purpose by using only the features that are related to telemetry data sources available
for the device.
In addition, the topology of the devices across the network captures how devices
are being related. The topology can be pairwise, e.g., device x and device y are related.
Devices can be further identified by expanding the fingerprint to include dynamic and
performance features. Topology is a dynamic feature in actual network use and is learned
by evaluating the traffic flow patterns of the device. This clustering feature can be added
by evaluating the telemetry variables related to traffic patterns. Clustering devices by
matching the available telemetry data to all possible features to get a subset of only
"telemetry tracked" features related to anomaly detection is a novel approach to clustering
for purposes related to building a multivariate, multi-device anomaly detection system.
After all of the relevant features are obtained, the devices are clustered using a
clustering algorithm. Once the cluster is formed, all historical telemetry data is aggregated
and one machine learning model is trained for each cluster. The ML solution is discussed
below.
According to another novel aspect of the described system, a deep learning model
structure is employed to detect anomalies on multiple telemetries at the same time,
considering the co-occurrence of the anomalies on multiple telemetries. In practice, the
system trains and deploys one model for one device within the same group, which can
significantly reduce the dimensionality in the solution space.
Network anomalies often have the following properties:


Temporal correlation: this part is readily evident; each telemetry is a time series.
The telemetry state will evolve over time.



Spatial correlation: Often, one anomaly manifests in a way that many
telemetries are affected at the same time, such as in the network loop condition.
In this case, investigating telemetries independently may not yield meaningful
result and can often raising false alarms. In this case, the approach needs to
properly address co-occurrence of anomalies for each device and among many
devices.

Under this setup, a long short-term memory based variational autoencoder (LSTMVAE) model structure is proposed for multimodal anomaly detection. An LSTM network
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can make use of the long-term dependencies in time series and avoid a vanishing gradient.
However, the result from LSTM alone is a single point estimate. The common practice for
LSTM is to compare the output with the observation, and differentiate normal and
abnormal with a threshold method. This approach works for univariate input. However,
given the scenario of a multi-dimensional input with different meaning (e.g., CPU, memory,
and interfaces), this approach is no longer effective.
The LSTM-VAE model structure is designed to learn a distribution of the input
features jointly. In particular, as shown in Fig. 3, the model has two parts: encoding and
decoding. For encoding, the model maps multi-dimensional observations across different
time periods into a latent space. For the decoding part, it estimates the expected distribution
of the time series input. The algorithm is designed such that, for each time step modeled,
it has a VAE structure. This model structure enables tracing back to individual telemetry
(features) over time to evaluate its behavior. Notice for each time the input is Xt: multidimensional telemetry value, and the output is μxt, σxt, the reconstructed mean and the
variance of Xt. Under this setup, the approach allows for monitoring of tens of thousands
of telemetry streams while dimensionality reduction is performed only for visualization
and explainability (e.g., "network anomaly score"). However, the Anomaly Detection
model is still analyzing all of the data streams without leaving any blind spots.

Fig. 3 - Generative Time Series Model
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This deep learning solution includes the following procedures:
2.1

Telemetry ingestion
The system collects telemetry data for monitoring and the data is sampled at a

suitable frequency. For example, if interested in tracking CPU and memory information,
for CPU, for each time period, there are n features: c1t, c2t, … , cnt. For memory, there are
altogether k features: m1t, m2t, … , mkt. All together, xt = (c1t, c2t, … , cnt,, m1t, m2t, … , mkt).
The number of times steps (T) for the model usually takes a value from 10 to 100. For
example, T=24 is chosen to capture the time correlation for the entire day if the sampling
rate is 1 hour and T=96 if the sampling interval is 15 minutes.
2.2

Design structure for LSTM-VAE
The latent variable Z for each time t usually has a low number of dimensions

(usually <5 dimensions). In most applications, the latent variable is assumed to be
Gaussian noise, where Zt ~ N(0, 1). For this application, it is proposed to vary the center
of normal distribution to be zt ~ (μp(t), Σp(t)). In this case, p(t) is modeled as a function of t,
which means each time t can have different mean. This allows introduction of temporal
dependency of the time series of data. This adjustment can make the model perform better
with time series data.
2.3 Training and testing
The LSTM-VAE model takes the telemetry inputs and provides the learned
distribution of the inputs for each time step. During training, all normal inputs are provided
without anomalies. During inference time, the real time telemetry input is compared with
learned distribution.
According to another novel aspect of the described system, by combining the results
from aforementioned techniques, the system produces a closed form health score for each
device and one risk score for the entire network that is easy to interpret and visualize. Once
the health score is low, the network manager can be notified. In addition, the system can
provide visual analysis on telemetry(s) which behave abnormally. Moreover, by tracking
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anomalies across different devices, the network manager can be notified about how an
anomaly propagates through the network.
During system deployment, following KPIs (health scores) are introduced. The
score for each device is modeled as ft = Prob(xt, μt, Σt), where xt is the multi-dimensional
telemetry input (note that this is the raw telemetry input, not the reduced dimension) at
time t, and μt, Σt are the learned mean and covariance of the telemetry input at time t. The
observation is determined to be out of bound if ft < 0.05. Essentially, this means the
probability of seeing such input is small. Monitoring of ft continues over time. If ft is out
of bounds for longer than some chosen time periods, a flag is raised. The risk of a device i
at time t is defined to be: ht,i = -log(ft,i), which is the negative log probability for device i at
time t. A high score means high chance of an anomaly. The risk score of the entire network
(for each time t) is θt = Σiwihi,t, where wi is a weight assigned to each device. These sets
of weights are given apriori. Depending on how critical each device is (e.g., position of
the network, vulnerability, etc.), the weights will vary. These sets of weights can be given
by a network manager or by customers.
Once the score is low, each of the individual telemetries can be broken down and
the reconstruction result can be plotted over time t. That is, if device has k telemetries,
there will be k plots of xti, μxti, σxti over t = 1,2, …, T for i in 1...k. The plot shown in Fig.
4 below assumes monitoring of two telemetries of a device. By comparing xti and the
reconstructed result μxti, σxti, the telemetry with issues can be pinpointed. In the plots of Fig.
4, the following are showcased: plot 1 and 2 are the individual anomaly monitoring results
(breakdowns) for telemetry 1 and 2; and plot 3 is the overall anomaly assessment score
which is computed according to the description above. As can be seen from the third plot,
the anomaly score ft drops really low during the second half of the time period due to an
issue with telemetry 1 (telemetry 2 is normal). The system is able to detect an anomaly
where some telemetries have issues while others do not. This capability is crucial, since it
is necessary not only to know whether there is a problem but also which telemetry(s) out
of possibly hundreds have issues that need to be addressed.
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Anomaly Monitoring for Device X

Fig. 4 – Anomaly Monitoring Results of One Device with Two Telemetries
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Action items from this approach are given below:
a. Continuously monitor the network base on health score; and
b. If score is low, no action is taken. If score is high, then drill down to each
individual telemetry using the observations and model output of the previous T times to
discover the telemetries with issues.
Yet another novel aspect of the disclosed system relates to resource utilization.
Specifically, the anomaly detection system can be used to understand the impact of the
network change by comparing old and new baselines. Fig. 5 illustrates one example where
the baseline has elevated after the software update. Based on the solution, the device
changes groups after an update happens.

Fig. 5 – Comparison of old and new baselines
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